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Abstract 
Moral hazard is a prominent issue in personal behaviour of credit risk management. This paper considered the 
bank loan interest rates as the control variables. It analysed the relationship between the default probability and 
the probability of the occurrence of moral hazard of individuals and the impact of moral hazard to individual 
credit risk mechanism from the theoretical level. The results show that: (1) the bank loan rates have strong 
effects on both the moral hazard of personal loan and credit risk. (2) The relationship of the probability of the 
occurrence of moral hazard of individuals and the default rate of individuals is generally non-linear. However, 
there is a constraint interval of the default rate. When that interval is determined, the probability of the 
occurrence of moral hazard of individuals and the default rate of individuals has linear relationship, and the 
bigger the interval is, the smaller probability of the occurrence of moral hazard is. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.  
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, with the rapid development of personal loans of China's commercial banks, personal loan 
becomes the hot spot of financial market competition with tremendous market potential. Currently, commercial 
banks all take the development of personal credit business as an important component of development strategy. 
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However, both in theoretical research and management tools and methods, domestic commercial banks 
consumer credit risk management is lagging behind the state, which seriously hindered the development of 
domestic consumer credit. Therefore, to strengthen the individual credit risk assessment and management is on 
urgent. Large number of cases shows: direct causes of personal credit default are mainly from two aspects: 
firstly, the borrower’s investment or management failure, which make them lose the repayment ability; 
secondly, the borrowers do not follow the loan agreement, and use the bank loans for other purposes, or the 
lack of willingness to repay. 
Current researches on credit risk are mainly about metrics and predictive probability of default, such as the 
classical theory based on option structural model 1, assuming that an event of default as a simplified model of 
random events 2, as well as a variety of statistically based and AI measurement methods 3. But there are few 
quantitative research for consumer credit customer credit risk, Huang Huizhong, Zhou Zongfang (2010) for the 
BP neural network in the personal credit evaluation model application defects, an improved LMBP algorithm 
and ILMBP personal credit evaluation model is applied 4; Li Jianping, etc. (2004) apply support vector machine 
(SVM) in commercial bank personal credit evaluation methods of the study, to obtain a better prediction results 
5; Yang Yu, Shi Xiuhong, etc. (2009) established a bilateral antibody probability model based on Artificial 
Immune mechanisms, and with the logistic regression model were compared 6; Yang Yang, Zhou Zongfang, 
etc. (2012) for the enterprise Group's credit risk and the credit risk of moral interactions have been studied 7 . 
So far, research on the interrelationship of moral hazard and the credit risk of personal loan is not found. 
This paper analyses the individual credit risk and the credit risk between moral influence mechanisms 
from the theoretical level. Section 2 of this paper is the underlying assumptions; Section 3 gives the measure 
formula for the probability of success of investment projects A; Section 4 and 5, respectively, discussed the 
lending rate on consumer credit and the credit risk of moral hazard effects, and based on this, discusses the 
transmission of the moral hazard of personal credit to credit risk and the reaction of the credit risk against 
moral hazard. 
2. Assumptions 
To simplify the discussion, assume that individual’s credit funds are invested in whether a more risky 
investment Project A or a less risky business Projects B. A project is characterized with high-risk and high-
return, while Project B is characterized with low-risk, low-return. Clearly, the Project A cannot apply for 
personal loans from banks, while Project B will receive bank loans. Without loss of generality, we make the 
following assumptions: 
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Hypothesis 1: The expected return of invest funds x in investment Project A is AxG , if the revenue of 
Project A is insufficient to repay the bank loan principal and interest, then Project A is deemed bad investment. 
The probability of Project A being a successful investment is denoted PA, the distribution function of AG is
˅˄< , its density function is ˅˄\ . 
Hypothesis 2: The expected return of investing funds x in operating project B is W, which is randomly 
distributed in [0ˈxGB ] 8, the conditional distribution functions and conditional density function, respectively, 
are x˅F W( and ˅˄ xf W , where xGB is the upper bound of the revenue of Project B. If the revenue of Project B 
is insufficient to repay the principal and interest, then Project B is deemed failed. 
Hypothesis 3: Once the investment fails, the consumer credit default occurs. 
In accordance to reality, the paper also made the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The game between banks and individuals are dominant individuals, that banks do not know 
the information that Project A is high-risk. 
Hypothesis 5: When the loan interest rate is sufficiently high, the probability of default personal credit 
loans rise with interest rates. 
3. Probability of Default Personal Loans Based on Moral Hazard 
3.1. Unsecured Assets 
Once moral hazard occurs, according to Merton (1974) model, we assume that the expected return of 
investing funds x in Project A is V= AxG , which follows a geometric Brownian motion, i.e. 
VdWVdtPdV A V                                                                                                                             (1)  
In this assumption, the conditions probability PA of Project A being successful depends on the expected 
profit of Project A and the principal and interest to pay after loan maturity, then the condition probability of 
Project A being failure is as follows. 
}lnPr{ln}Pr{1 00 VVDVVVDVP ttttA                                                                  (2) 
Among them, Vt and Dt respectively are the expected return of Project A and the principal and interest to 
pay at t time (when loan is due), V0 is the initial expected return of Project A. 
According to formula (1), the expected return of Project A at t  time is as follows 
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Among them, P indicates the risk-free rate. For  ~ 0,1NH , then
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Under the normal distribution assumption, the conditional probability of Project A being success is as 
follows: 
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Among them,  )  indicates the cumulative probability function of the standard normal distribution. 
According to Hypothesis 3, when Project A fails, the probability of consumer credit default can be 
measured by the following formula. 
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3.2. Secured Assets 
When asset-backed is considered, presume that the market value of the guaranty is Mt at t time (when the 
loan is due), then the sum of the expected return V of Project A and the value of guaranty M exceed the sum of 
the principal and interest of the loan tD , Project A is success, and the probability of it is                
PA=Pr{k=Vt+M-Dt >0}                                                                                                                       (7) 
So, when pledge of assets is considered, the default probability function of consumer credit is:
 w f N ˈ t tV M DN    ˈ > @0,1w                                                                                       (8) 
In the figure below, w demonstrates the probability of default, when the personal mortgage is invested in 
Project A.  
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Fig.1.  Personal mortgage default probability function  
Apparently, f(k) is decreasing function of k.. Considering the factor of Loss Aversion [8-9], when 0N t , 
the magnitude of individuals to reduce the probability of default caused by k rise a unit is smaller than the 
magnitude of individuals to increase the probability of default caused by k decline a unit. Therefore, when 
0N t , f(k) is a concave function, denoted as g(k), when 0N t , according to Hypothesis 3, defaults is 
inevitable, so f(k)=1. 
Based on the analysis above, we can construct a default probability function when a personal mortgage 
loan is invested in Project A:  
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Among them, g(k) is a concave function, which can be set according to specific condition. Therefore, we 
get the method to measure the default rate of a personal mortgage loan, when personal mortgage loan is 
invested in Project A, in the case that pledge of assets is considered. 
4. Effect of Moral Hazard 
4.1 Personal moral hazard 
If individual borrow money xB from a bank with interest rate r, and invest the money in operational 
Project B, according to Hypothesis 2, the expected return when Project B is success is 
³   E WWW)1( )()]1([)( rx BBBB B dxfrxxV                                                                                          (10) 
Among them, E=xBGB indicates the upper bound of the return of investing funds xB in Project B. 
Step calculate formula (10), we get  
 ³  E WWEE  @> U[ %%%%% % G[)[)[U[9                                                        (11) 
According to the nature of distribution function, 1)(  BxF E , so formula (11) can be noted as 
³  E WWE )1( )()1()( rx BBBB B dxFxrxV                                                                                       (12) 
If an individual borrow money xB from a bank for Project B and invest them in Project A, according to 
Hypothesis 1, the expected return of Project A is  
)]1([)( rxxPxV BABABA  G                                                                                                     (13) 
If moral hazard exist in personal credit, then when the expected return of Project A is far higher than that 
of Project B, the individual will move the fund of Project B into Project A, when the following formula holds, 
the personal credit will have moral hazard.  
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Among them, Jt1 is the personal risk appetite factor, which reflects the extent how the expected return of 
Project A is higher than Project B when both of them are successful. If an individual is risk appetite type, when 
Jt1, as long as the expected return of Project A is higher than Project B when success, personal moral hazard 
will occur; If the individual is risk averse, then only when J is large enough, moral hazard will occur.  
Furthermore, the right part of formula (15) in denoted as:  
)(
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                                                               (15) 
Then the probability of personal credit occurrence of moral hazard is: 
))((1 rHPM <                                                                                                                                    (16) 
Among them, ˅˄<  is the distribution function of AG . 
Derivate formula (15) on r, then 
 )]1())1(([)( ABB PxrxFr
rH  w
w J                                                                                          (17) 
According to Hypothesis 2, ))1(( BB xrxF   is the probability of operating Project B to fail and the 
probability of Project B to fail ought to be less than that of Project A 
))1((1 BBA xrxFP !                                                                                                                       (18) 
So 0)( w
w
r
rH
. In other worlds, with the increase in bank lending rates r , H(r) decreases 
monotonically, and according to formula (16) and the character of distribution function, PM increases 
monotonically. Thus we can get the following conclusions:  
Conclusion 1: If there is moral hazard of consumer credit, consumer credit probability of occurrence of 
moral hazard increases monotonically along with the bank loans interest rates increasing. 
4.2. Individual credit risk 
If an individual borrows money from a bank at interest rate r, then the probability of consumer credit 
default that the bank facing is  
  ))1((1()1( xrxFPPPP MAMD  ˅                                                                                       (19) 
Among them, the first item indicates the probability of Project A to fail, when moral hazard happens to 
consumer credit; the second item indicates the probability of Project B to fail, when moral hazard do not 
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happen to consumer credit.  
According to formula (19), the default probability of consumer credit PD do not always monotonically 
increase along with the probability of moral hazard of consumer credit increasing, but depend on the revenue 
distribution of PA and Project BN. Especially, when the probability of moral hazard of consumer credit is 0, the 
default rate of consumer credit equals that of Project B to fail. 
The following discussion is about the relation between bank lending rates and probability of personal 
credit default DP . 
We may assume that the probability of default PD is a continuous function of r, according to Conclusion 1, 
when the lending interest rate r reach the minimum value(denoted as r0), the probability of moral hazard of 
consumer credit is minimum, therefore, when r = 0r , PM|0 which means that the default rate of consumer 
credit PD approximately equals to the probability of Project B to fail   1F x r x . According to the 
characteristic of distribution function, there is a certain sufficiently small positive half-neighborhood of r0 
OH=[r0ˈr0+H], in which H is a sufficiently small positive number, when rOH, default probability  increases 
along with the increasing of r , then.  
),[0 000 H! rrrdr
dP
rr
D ˈ                                                                                                              (20) 
Derivate formula (19) at r : 
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Furthermore, according to hypothesis 2, for any 1- > @0,1AP  , there is certain HOrr  ˆ , making
))ˆ1((1 xrxFPA   , so according to formula (21): 
0ˆ  rrDdr
dP
                                                                                                                                           (22) 
Then according to Hypothesis 5, there is ˆr r! , making 
0~ ! rrDdr
dP
                                                                                                                                           (23) 
Therefore, there is )~,ˆ( rrr , making 0  rrDdr
dP
, in other words, when )~,ˆ( rrrr  , the default 
probability PD reaches the minimum. It can be seen that the lending interest rate 0r that making the probability 
PD of moral hazard of consumer credit minimum is not the lending interest rate that make the default 
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probability minimum.  
Furthermore, from formula (20), (21), and (23), we can see that the default probability of consumer credit
DP  is monotonically increasing at 0r , but DP  first increases monotonically then decreases monotonically and 
then increase again, along with the increasing of the lending interest rate r. That means there is a lending 
interest rate r  and r  which respectively make the consumer credit default probability reaching the maximum 
and minimum. And r  is in the interval (r0, r ). In other words, along with the lending interest rate r increasing, 
the default probability of consumer credit first increase and then reaches the maximum at rr   and then 
decrease, reaching the minimum at rr  . 
Corollary 1: When moral hazard of consumer credit exists, the lending interest rate r  that makes the 
consumer credit reaching minimum is bigger than the lending interest rate r  that makes the maximum. 
Definition 1: If the probability of consumer credit default increases with lending rate r, then r is a lending 
rates which increases according to personal credit defaults probability; otherwise, if the individual credit 
default probability increases with lower lending rates (r ( r , r )), then we say r is a lending rates which 
declines according to personal credit defaults probability. 
The Corollary 1 showed that: when the moral hazard of personal credit exists, with the lower interest rates 
on bank loans, consumer credit default probability PD do not a monotonically decline, lower lending rates do 
not necessarily reduce the risk of default of consumer credit. In other words, the bank can not lower lending 
rates to control consumer credit default risk.  
4.3. Consumer’s moral hazard 
According to Conclusion 1, with the increase in bank lending rates r , probability of moral hazard of 
personal credit PM monotonically increase, but default probability of consumer credit PD is not monotonically 
increasing. Therefore we get the following important conclusions: 
Conclusion 2: The relation between default probability and the probability of moral hazard of consumer 
credit is neither non-monotonic nor non-linearity. And there is exogenous lending rate r and r , respectively 
making individual credit default probability reaches a maximum and minimum. 
Corollary 2: With the probability of moral hazard of consumer credit increases monotonically, the default 
rate of personal credit, first to reach the maximum and then reach the minimum. 
Furthermore, according to formula(14)~(16), the smaller the gap between PAGA and GB is, the bigger H(r) 
is, the smaller the probability of moral hazard of personal credit PM =1- ))(( rHΦ  is. Therefore, the transfer 
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mechanism of the moral hazard of personal credit to credit risk is as follows: (1) If the probability of moral 
hazard of the individual credit probability is 0, then the probability of default on consumer credit is equal to 
the probability of failure of Project B. (2) If the expected return of Project A is slightly larger than the return 
upper bound of Project B, then the probability of moral hazard of consumer credit is low. Once moral hazard 
occur in  consumer credit, then the default probability of consumer credit will show a monotonic increase 
trends, along with the loan interest rate rising.(3) If the expected return of Project A is far larger than the 
return upper bound of Project B, then the probability of moral hazard of consumer credit is high. And the 
personal credit default rate will first decline and then rise, along with the rising of the lending interest rate.   
5. Impact of Moral Hazard 
The following discussion is about the counterproductive of individual credit risk to moral hazard. Denote
))1(( xrxF  T , which is the probability of failure of Project B. According to formula (16), then  
T
TT
--1
-
1()1( ˅˄˅ A
D
MMAMD P
P
PPPPP                                                                              (24) 
Because the probability of failure of Project A is higher than that of Project B, the denominator of the 
formula is positive. Apparently, PD [Tˈ1-PA](the default rate of personal credit is ranged between the 
probability of failure of Project A and the probability of failure of Project B). Given certain value of 1-PA and T, 
the probability of moral hazard of consumer credit PM changes in the same direction with the probability of 
default PD. Especially, If the consumer credit moral hazard has not occur(PM=0). The default rate of consumer 
credit equals to the probability of failure of Project B, that isT. If the consumer credit moral hazard occurs 
(PM=0). The default rate of consumer credit equals to the probability of failure of Project A that is 1-PA.   
Conclusion 3˖(1)The default rate of consumer credit PD [Tˈ1-PA], if T and 1-PA are all unchanged, the 
probability of moral hazard of consumer credit PM and the default rate PD changes in the same direction. (2) 
When the default rate of consumer credit PD is unchanged, the probability of failure of Project A that is 1-PA is 
increasing; or 1-PA is unchanged, whileT is decreasing, then the probability of moral hazard of consumer credit 
PM will decrease.  
Definition 2˖The interval [Tˈ1-PA] is called the constraint interval of default rate of consumer credit.  
Apparently, on one hand, the bigger the interval is, the smaller the probability of the moral hazard of 
consumer credit is, on the other hand, when the constraint interval of the default rate is determined, for the 
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probability of the moral hazard of consumer credit changes in the same direction with the default rate, the 
individual that have greater credit risk(the default rate PD fall into the right half of interval [Tˈ1-PA]), once the 
asset further deteriorate, the probability of moral hazard of it will further increase.  
6. Conclusions 
This paper discusses the inner mechanism of moral hazard of personal credit and credit risk.  From the 
theoretical level, this paper gets some important conclusions as follows: (1) When moral hazard exists in 
consumer credit, bank lending rates r  and personal credit probability of occurrence of moral hazard change in 
the same direction. (2) Consumer credit default probability and the probability of occurrence of moral hazard 
are in non-linear relationship. (3) There is an exogenous lending rate, making the probability of default of 
consumer credit reached extremes.(4) There is a constraint interval for the probability of default, when the 
interval is determined, the probability of individual credit risk of moral hazard PM  and the probability of default 
PD changes in the same direction and the greater range is the smaller the probability of personal credit of moral 
hazard is. 
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